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ABSTRACT 
The manner in which employers first respond to unions directly affects the quality of labor 
relations that come to be established between both parties. In an effort to explain why employers 
initially react as they do, this study compares employer responses to unionization efforts launched by 
longshoremen on opposite coasts of the United States after World War I. Whereas shipowners on the 
West Coast vigorously resisted dockside unionism, their counterparts in the Port of New York adopted a 
much more accomodating posture. Drawing on employer records, trade publications, newspaper 
accounts, and government documents, as  well as  relevant secondary sources, I trace these contrasting 
responses to the shipowners' relative "class capacities," as  shaped by regional variations in industry 
structure and .markets. The implications of this analysis are briefly discussed. 
Introduction 
American labor's political contours have been historically shaped by the degree of employer 
resistance to emergent working class organization. In the drive to organize basic industry during the 
1930s, one of the principal "staging areas of Communist penetration," writes a leading specialist, was 
"violent employer opposition to unionism."' Where reactionary employers aggressively resisted the 
extension of "economic citizenship," as  for example in auto, hard rock mining, and marine, workers 
embraced a more combative and politically radical leadership than in such industries as  rubber, glass, 
and wood products where opposition to union recognition was less strenuous.2 As a problem of historical 
sociology, the question is why, in the first place, does capital embark on a course of either conflict or 
accommodation towards organized labor? 
I examine this question through an historical and comparative analysis of employer responses in 
the American longshore industry. Between World War I, when the International Longshoremen's 
Association (ILA), a conservative craft union, began a sustained organizing drive on the docks, and the 
consolidation of waterfront unions almost two decades later, 'shipowners on both coasts pursued very 
different approaches to organized labor. On the East Coast, particularly in the Port of New York, they 
maintained uninterrupted and harmonious relations with the ILA during the open-shop 1920s and 
throughout the turbulent 1930s. In marked contrast, shipowners on'the West Coast waged a protracted, 
a t  times violent, campaign to suppress any signs of independent unionism on the docks: refusing to 
recognize the ILA, blacklisting its supporters, and setting up company unions in several ports. 
Comparing employer responses in 1930, Joseph Ryan, ILA International President, commended 
shipowners on the North Atlantic for not taking "undue advantage" of the union, while chastising 
"steamship interests on the Pacific Coast" for "not yet displayKing1 sufficient confidence in our 
organization. II 3 
Longshoremen on both coasts drew very different lessons from the way they were treated by the 
shipowners. In the West, employer intransigence provided "powerful, practical support for the view that 
the interests of the employers and those of the men were deeply opposed."4 Indeed, with every attempt 
to weaken or destroy the union, another nail was driven into the coffin of class collaboration. In this 
way, the shipowners played right into the hands of radical insurgents who rose to power on the West 
Coast, breaking away from the ILA in 1937 to form the militantly left-wing International 
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU). In New York, employer moderation had just the 
opposite effect. Having seen the shipowners a t  their best, the port's dockworkers found little use for the 
class conflict imagery and practices that appealed so strongly to longshoremen in the West. Based on 
their own experience, the rank and file had no reason to doubt, much less question, the employers' 
intentions. Rejecting the West's radicalism, they refused to enter the ILWU, preferring instead the 
cautious conservatism of the ILA. 
The character of longshore unionism on both coasts was thus shaped by contrasting employer 
responses. But why, returning to our original question, did the shipowners respond so differently in the 
first place? Why, especially given similar structural constraints--based in the same industry, facing the 
same international union, and even representing many of the same companies--did shipowners fight 
unionization in the West and yet accept it in New York? 
Employer Resistance to Unionization 
Industry structure is widely regarded as  an important, if not the most important, determinant of 
capital's response to labor. Empirical research shows a c o n s i ~ t e n t ~ s t r o n ~  relationship between the 
degree of monopolization, as measured by industry concentration ratios, and the quality of labor 
relations, evidenced for example in the extent of unionization and wage levels. In general, the strongest 
unions are found in the most highly concentrated manufacturing industries. 5 
Various explanations have been advanced to account for the correspondence between "big labor" 
and "big capital." Economists point out that industrial concentration may actually facilitate unionization 
in a number of ways. First, it is easier for a union, once established, to maintain its organizational 
strength in concentrated industries where high capital requirements, patent restrictions, and recognized 
brand names serve a s  effective entry barriers to smaller and more cost-conscious firms. Second, given 
the capital intensity of production in the monopoly sector, the cost of labor relative to other inputs is low, 
while the need for stability in planning horizons and labor relations is proportionately higher, thus 
making collective bargaining more affordable, on the one hand, and clearly advantageous, on the other. 
And, finally, because monopolistic "price makers" typically earn higher rates of profit, they can more 
easily absorb the cost of unionization, or in more "permissive" product markets simply pass added labor 
costs onto consumers in the form of higher prices. 6 
But immediate economic interest is not the only moderating force acting upon big business. 
According to another school of thought, the largest corporations are also highly conscious of their long- 
term interests as a class. This class awareness, supposedly reflecting their more diversified holdings 
and economic interests, has propelled the corporate elite into the front ranks of social reform--if for no 
other reason than to stave off lower class protest and maintain their own hegemony. It is these class 
conscious "corporate- liberals" who, we are told, have traditionally been most supportive of collective 
bargaining and labor's right to organize. Smaller business men, on the other hand, because they are 
"tied more immediate] to the market," have adopted "attitudes towards unions ... [that] were more rigid 
and uncompromising. 1 9 3  
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-3 Yet the growth of organized labor in the United States has followed a rather different path from . , 
-+ that charted by the theory of corporate liberalism. The earliest and strongest unions did not arise in the 
heartland of the emerging corporate economy, but rather on the periphery, in such highly competitive 
industries a s  construction, trucking, and coal mining. In fact, the largest manufacturing corporations 
have more often been hotbeds of employer reaction than outposts of liberalism. Long after many 
smaller firms were unionized, industrial giants like General Motors and U.S. Steel continued fighting 
.r,- -- ., labor with every weapon a t  their disposal, drawing on their substantial financial resources to maintain a 
vast network of company spies, hire private security forces and recruit strike breakers when necessary . 
As a result, auto and steel--two of the nation's most concentrated industries--remained open shop 
strongholds well into the 1930s. 
What this suggests is .that industrial concentration "appears to opekate as a double-edged 
sword," as a student of the problem has recently put ite8 In responding to the threat of unionization, the 
secure financial position of large firms enables them to more easily accommodate added labor costs. Yet 
it is this same financial security that gives large firms a greater ability to resist unions. To understand 
why a strategy of accommodation or resistance becomes dominant in different industries a t  various 
points in time, it is necessary to take a closer look a t  the- full array of economic forces impinging upon 
employers. 
Employer ksis tance on the Waterfront 
During the interwar years, the maritime industry closely approximated the economist's model of 
perfect competition. With a large number of suppliers and little to differentiate one from the other, 
shipping was a risky, highly competitive undertaking. Profit margins, never very wide to begin with, all 
but disappeared with the slump in shipping activity following the stock market crash. In 1931, 83% of 
all America-owned intercoastal carriers lost money, a s  did 36% of coastwide companies and 37% of 
operators engaged in overseas trade.' For individual shippers already operating close to the margin, 
failure to "hold the line" could mean financial ruin, while for the industry as a whole, stiff competition 
from alternate modes of domestic transportation as  well a s  from foreign shipping lines exerted a strong 
downward pressure on wages and other variable costs of production. The competitive nature of the 
product market thus produced an industry-wide "intolerance" towards unions, especially on the docks 
where labor costs represented the single largest ship operating expense. 10 
. 
Within the constraints imposed by industry economics, however, waterfront employers were far 
more intransigent on the Pacific than in New York. In part, this reflected the very different character 
of the initial contact between labor and capital on both coasts, with employers in the West reacting more 
aggressively to the presence of syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) organizers on the 
docks--"matching fire with fire," a s  the shipowners saw it." But if radicalism in labor tended to elicit a 
like response from capital, it did not resolve the problem of how to organize employer resistance, for the 
shipowners still faced the difficult task of translating their anti-union passions into effective industry- 
wide resistance. Put simply, they had yet to constitute themselves as  a class. 
In shipping--as indeed in most competitive product markets--the capacity for employer self- 
organization grew as  the industry itself became more concentrated. In England, for example, shipowner 
associations did not really take hold until after the turn of the century, when the process of 
concentration had advanced far enough to create a few large firms whose consolidated economic strength 
and more expansive vision enabled them to provide leadership as  well as  organizational direction for the 
industry as  a whole. Summarizing these developments, Hobsbawn writes: 
On the waterside, employers had to achieve a degree of concentration which allowed them to see 
the problem as one of the industry a s  a whole, and not merely as  one of individual entrepreneurs 
or sections within it; or else sections of large employers, with wider views, had to be effectively 
counterposed to the multiplicity of small ones with a narrower outlook. 12 
Similarly, in the United States, industrial concentration was a necessary condition for employer 
organization on the waterfront. On the Great Lakes, the massive Isthmian Line, a corporate subsidiary 
of U.S. Steel, was the driving force behind the Lake Carriers Association. The powerful Lykes-Ripley 
shipping combine took charge of organizing its smaller Gulf Coast competitors. And on the Pacific 
Coast, this crucial leadership role was collectively assumed by the "Big Three" firms of Matson, 
American-Hawaiian, and Dollar. 13 
While industrial concentration provided a basis for employer organization on the West Coast, the 
thrust and direction of their mobilization efforts--whether towards accommodation or resistance--was 
largely determined by industry economics. Given the competitiveness of the product market and the 
resulting industry-wide intolerance of unions, the far-sightedness of the largest firms was not a vision of 
accommodation, much less one of class harmony, as the theory of corporate liberalism might predict. On 
the contrary, the largest firms on the Pacific were the staunchest and most vigorous opponents of 
dockside unionization on the coast. 
New York's largest operators, on the other hand, although bound by similar economic 
constraints, ended up responding like corporate liberals--not because they were any more "class 
conscious" or reform-minded, but simply because the less concentrated structure of shipping in the East, 
by creating formidable obstacles to employer organization, left them little choice. Table 1 compares 
industrial structures in New York and the West Coast. Compiled from the 1930 &cord of the American 
Bureau of Shipping, it ranks, on the basis of vessel ownership, the ten largest American lines 
headquartered in both regions. 
The aggregate vessel tonnage of the ten largest companies in both regions was approximately 
the same. Yet, as  Table 1 reveals, its overall distribution was very different. In the West, vessel 
ownership was concentrated among the "Big Three" of Mgtson, American Hawaiian, and Dollar. 
Together, they accounted for over 60 percent of the tonnage held by the ten largest West Coast Lines. 
After that, the dropoff was so precipitous that Dollar, the number three firm, had more than twice the 
holdings of the next largest company. In contrast, no such clean break can be found in New York. 
There, vessel ownership was more evenly distributed, as  along a continuum, with no single line enjoying 
more than a 20 percent advantage over its nearest ranked competitor. Thus, among the ten largest 
American lines in both regions, the top three companies held nearly two-thirds of all tonnage on the 
Pacific while their counterparts in New York controlled less than two-fifths. 
(Insert Table 1 Here) 
These dissimilar industrial structures decisively shaped employer responses in both regions. As 
we will see, capital concentration in the West placed the "Big Three" American lines in a commanding 
position from which to provide leadership and organizational initiative for the multiplicity of smaller 
employers. Constrained by the industry's low tolerance for unionism, the Big Three, a s  industry-wide 
leaders, consolidated the rest of the coast around a militantly anti-union program. In New York, 
however, the more even distribution of shipping capital left the port's medium-size employers leaderless 
and without direction. Lacking an organizational center of gravity, and a t  the same time internally 
divided by the presence of competing commercial, government, and foreign interests, the shipowners' low 
tolerance for unionism in New York was expressed not in collective resistance, a s  on the West Coast, but 
rather through informal modes of accommodation between local union leaders and individual shipping 
lines. 
The ."Big Three" Organize the Pacific 
Employers on the West Coast vigorously opposed organized labor from the very beginning. In 
1914, well before the I.W.W. was even much of a force on the docks, San Francisco shipowners formed 
the open-shop Waterfront Employers Association, the first such organization of its kind anywhere in the 
7. 
"..- country to deal exclusively with longshore labor. Within a few years, employers in each of the major - ports had established separate negotiating bodies for sailors and longshoremen. This 
2 . L  "departmentalization" plan altered the basic contours of the emerging marine working class, splintering 
what was then a fairly unified and homogenous labor force along traditional craft lines, and in this way 
reasserting the primacy of occupation over industry as  the basis of collective action. In the words of 
maritime historican William Camp, this formal reorganization "made it appear that there was no 
, . common interest between shore workers and the men who sailed the ships--a strategy which prevented -' all the waterfront workers from uniting along industrial lines for many years."15 
r 
'I-? The Big Three were prime movers in these early reorganization efforts. Through their control of 
the San Francisco employers' association, which provided leadership to local organizations in the 
Northwest and San Pedro, they exercised a significant influence on coastwide policy. According to 
Thomas Plant, past President of the San Francisco association, American-Hawaiian was the "moving 
spirit" behind the city's waterfront employers, with Matson, Dollar, and two smaller lines playing an 
important supportive role throughout the 1920s.16 
Pacific shipowners grew restive with the onset of the depression. Plant, a corporate Vice- 
President with American-Hawaiian, assumed the Presidency of the San Francisco waterfront employers. 
Under his aggressive leadership, West Coast shipowners adopted an increasingly belligerent posture 
towards longshore unionism. In March of 1934, with 12,000 longshoremen on the Pacific Coast 
preparing to walk out to enforce their demands for closed shop recognition of the ILA and union- 
controlled hiring, Plant defiantly announced that "thousands of men now unemployed will be glad to get 
the jobs." When the strike finally broke out two months later, Roger Lapham, President of American- 
Hawaiian, took an equally firm line. Branding strike leaders "out and out Communists," he 
characterized the demand for union recognition as  an  attempt to "break down the walls of 
government. 1117 
The employers a t  first welcomed the walkout as an  opportunity to finally rid the waterfront of 
longshore unionism. A government mediator directly involved in pre-strike negotiations later wrote his 
superiors a t  the National Labor Board that "the shipowners were confident of victory and gave me to 
understand that even if they lost two or three million, it would be worth it to destroy the union." But 
the cost of doing battle with the ILA proved far greater than the employers had anticipated. The 
paralysis of maritime commerce during the first month of the strike idled an estimated $45 million 
worth of coastwise cargo. l8 Besides incurring hugh losses in revenue, shipowners paid out of their own 
pockets considerable sums to maintain small scale, largely symbolic strikebreaking operations in several 
ports. In San Pedro, where these efforts were most successful, provisions for housing, feeding, and 
protection non-union dockworkers cost local employers around $7,000 a day. 19 
Yet the shipowners remained adamant. Early in the walkout, the mayor of San Francisco met 
with a group of "prominent shipping men" to discuss the impasse. The shipowners, represented by an 
officer from each of the Big Three firms and one other company, flatly refused to concede any ground to 
the union. With these hardliners dictating employer strategy, the walkout dragged on for three months 
before the shipowners reluctantly agreed to recognize the ILA. 2 0 
Settlement of the 1934 strike failed to soften employer opposition to the new union. Instead, 
they attempted, as  the La Follette Committee later put it, "to drive a wedge between the radical and 
conservative elements" in the ILA. Harry Bridges, the fiery young leader of the San Francisco local, 
was the principal target of this campaign. Early in 1935, Lapham traveled to Washington to personally 
urge the Secretary of Labor to initiate deportation proceedings against Bridges, an  Australian 
immigrant and alleged ~ o m m u n i s t . ~  When government cooperation was not readily forthcoming, San 
Francisco employers turned to conservative union officers for help in dislodging Bridges. Over a period 
of several months, the shipowners--again led by the Big Three--covertly supplied money, organizing 
resources, advice, and encouragement to conservative District and International ILA leaders. Summing 
up these efforts in a confidential memo, Plant wrote in the Spring of 1935: 
We have worked all angles--the Department of Labor, J.P. Ryan, Lewis, Petersen, and other 
conservative ILA leaders on this coast. Our only apparent hope of progress lay in trying to 
persuade the conservative leaders that if they wanted to preserve anything for the ILA, they 
would have to set their own house in order ... We have had reason to believe that [conservatives'l 
Lewis and Peterson and some of the others are really making progress. I t  is, of course, a slow 
process. It is obvious that if we do anything to hurt Lewis and Petersen and the other 
conservatives a t  this time, we nullify all the work they are doing in their efforts to clean out the 
radicals. 2 2 
But conservative ILA leaders were in no position to rally an aroused rank and file behind any 
such "anti-radical" crusade. Recognizing this, the employers embraced a more confrontational approach. 
"I am for decisive action a t  this time," Lapham declared in presenting his "suspension program" before 
a strategy meeting of the waterfront employers. His proposal called for unilaterally suspending 
relations with the ILA until its "irresponsible leadership" publically agreed to clamp down on 
unauthorized job actions. In this way, Lapham argued, the employers could create distance, if not a 
clean break between Bridges and other radical leaders, who were contractually bound to enforce the 
existing agreement, and an increasingly restive rank and file. Reservations were expressed by many 
smaller companies as  well as  several New York-based intercoastal lines, but the Big Three once again 
prevailed. Representatives from American-Hawaiian, Matson, and a leading British line were then sent 
east to shore-up support for the suspension program. In December the New York Times reported that 
shipowners on both coasts "are said to be in constant contact ... and well informed sources indicate the 
employers are ready for a showdown." 2 3 
The shipowners patiently waited for an appropriate situation to execute their suspension 
program. Employer documents from this period, as  summarized by the La Follette Committee, revealed 
a 
somewhat startling spectacle of a group of employers, who, having determined to engage the 
unions with which they had agreements in a struggle that would interrupt commerce and 
business on a wide scale, were unable to find a pretext for initiating the conflict that could be put 
reasonably before the public and the unions.24 
A suitable opportunity finally presented itself in April, when the "Santa Rosa," an intercoastal steamer 
manned by a crew of strikebreakers, docked a t  San Pedro. Declaring the Santa Rosa "unfair," West 
Coast marine workers refused to work the non-union vessel. The employers decided to discharge all 
passengers and mail in San Pedro and then reroute the Santa Rosa north in an attempt to unload its 
remaining "hot cargo." When, as  expected, San Francisco longshoremen threw up a picket line around 
the Santa Rosa, the waterfront employers promptly suspended relations with the union. 
That Bridges' removal from office, rather than the public issue of contract compliance, was the 
employers' main objective became immediately apparent with their announcement that the entire port 
would remain shut "until Harry Bridges is no longer head of the union." But this smoothly executed 
lock-out backfired. Instead of discrediting Bridges, it transformed him into a martyr, rallying not only 
rank and file longshoremen to his defense, but also some of San Francisco's most conservative and 
. respected labor leaders. After the port had been tied up for one week, "Bloody Mike" Casey, an old-line 
Teamster leader who had openly clashed with Bridges during the 1934 waterfront strike, presented a 
motion to the Central Labor Council condemning the shipowners. "We can't let the employers tell us 
who will represent us," he argued, "no matter what we may think of the particular leader who happens 
to be in question." With the labor movement contemplating some form of direct action to support the 
longshoremen, the shipowners opened the port the following morning. 25 
Calm had scarcely returned to the waterfront when battle lines began forming once again. In 
$3- , ., . June, an eight-member "Coast Committee for the Shipowners" was assembled to coordinate employer 
efforts aimed a t  modifying the longshore agreement scheduled to expire in a few months. Chaired by .. , Plant of American-Hawaiian, and including both Dollar and Matson representatives, the Coast 
,..- - ., . Committee approached contract negotiations with rigid inflexibility, issuing a series of relatively 
inconsequential but firm ultimatums to the union. In this acrimonious atmosphere, the ILA's "fairly 
moderate demands," a s  a leading industry journal characterized the union's position, were rejected 
outright by the Coast Committee. During the final days of negotiations, a coalition of 26 European and 
I ir . . -. East Coast American lines broke with the Coast Committee, and offered the ILA a separate agreement. 
Describing the offer a s  "virtually a capitulation," the commercial press reported "it struck the 
waterfront like an earthquake."26 
Buoyed by the prospect of an imminent settlement, the Pacific Shipper editorialized that the 
employers' conciliatory mood evidenced: 
... the lessons which the shipowners have learned in more than two years of incessant contact 
with the modern labor problem. I t  explains why they are confident that the disputes will be 
settled by arbitration and conciliation in the long run; why they are neither as reactionary nor as 
craven as  they have been painted ... why such of them as  did not know the virtues of moderation 
before have discovered them now. 
But if some shippers had learned "the virtues of moderation," the Big Three were not among them. 
Working feverishly behind the scenes, they patched up the schism within their ranks and pressed 
forward with strike preparations. As the union later charged, a "minority group ... known on the coast as  
the 'Big Three,' blocked all reasonable efforts for peaceful settlement." The rift among the employers 
was even acknowledged by industry sources. Midway through the ensuing walkout, the Pacific Shipper 
conceded that the aggressive "methods" of the Big Three "have been questioned by other operators--even 
to the extent of breaking away from their leadership." 27 
The 1936-37 strike ended without significant gains by either side. Yet the employers came 
away with a deeper understanding of the need for regional organization. The "go it alone" attitude of 
many shipowners, exemplified in the pre-strike defection of 26 companies from Coast.Committee policy, 
had produced only divisiveness and defeat. To combat the growing solidarity of the marine working 
class, individual - lines, even local port associations, were no longer any match. What the shipowners 
needed, Lapham insisted, was nothing less than "One Big Union of Employers." The "Lapham formula" 
was finally adopted in the summer of 1937, and the Waterfront Employers' Association (WEA) of the 
Pacific Coast was born.28 
For the WEA to become more than a paper tiger, however, it had to tackle the problem of 
representativeness. Like any new employer association, the WEA faced the challenge of forging an 
industry-wide consensus out of the immediate and sometimes conflicting interests of its constituent 
members. Organizationally, the answer lay in drawing a clear line of demarcation between the WEA 
and its membership, such that the association acquired what Kerr and Fisher describe a s  "an 
institutional character and identity somewhat distinct from that of any of its member firms." 
Transposed into the language of structuralist Marxism, the WEA had to establish its "relative 
autonomy" from individual lines in order to legitimately serve as  an instrument for representing the 
industry a s  a whole. 29 
Concern over the representativeness of the WEA ran high among waterfront employers. Given 
the recent falling out between the Big Three and the 26 defecting lines, it became imperative for the 
WEA to demonstrate a t  the outset its independence from either faction. Accordingly, its founding Board 
of Directors sought a neutral administrator from outside the industry to head the organization. Almon 
Roth, comptroller of Stanford University for the past eighteen years, was ultimately chosen not "for his 
ship operating experience, but for his ability to solve public relations problems and to reconcile diverse 
points of view," observed the Pacific Marine Review, a usually reliable industry journal. With an 
industry "outsider" a t  its head, the WEA enjoyed greater autonomy than any of its predecessors, 
including the many local port associations and the short-lived Coast Committee. 3 0 
Yet the concentrated structure of the industry sharply limited the WEA's independence from the 
largest employers. This was perhaps most evident in the procedures for allocating votes to each 
member company. Table 2, which I compiled from internal employer documents, shows the strength of 
the major voting blocks within the WEA as determined by the total volume of tonnage shipped through 
Pacific Coast ports during 1936. West Coast operators, including both deepwater and coast-wise lines, 
held a clear majority of all votes. But within this majority block, the Big Three accounted for more votes 
than both the 39 coastwise schooner companies and the six remaining deepwater lines, together. The 
Big Three, with 51 votes between them, directly controlled almost one-fourth of the total votes allocated 
to all 108 member companies of the WEA. A more detailed breakdown of voting strength shows that 
only eight other companies received as  many as  three votes each, and of this small group, only two lines 
had more than six votes. This highly skewed distribution of voting strength assured the Big Three of a 
continuing role in leading the employers down a path of maximum resistance to unionism. 
(Insert Table 2   ere)^' 
Em~lover  Disor~anization in New York 
The maritime industry in New York was marked by a wider dispersion of capital than in the 
West. Whereas shipping on the Pacific was dominated by three large firms, the economic landscape in 
New York was cluttered with more than a dozen medium-size commercial American lines. Without a 
core leadership group capable of providing port-wide direction, domestic shipping interests remained 
poorly and incompletely organized, and thus highly vulnerable to union pressure. Unable to resist 
collectively, individual lines cultivated informal, often collaborative, relations with local ILA leaders. 
The moderating influence of employer disorganization on the New York waterfront was evident 
as  early a s  1907 when, during a wildcat dock strike, several coastwise companies broke a "solidarity 
pact" with deepwater lines in order to accommodate union.wage demands. After settling the strike, the 
shipowners were still unable to agree on a port-wide labor policy, leaving the basic issue of union 
recognition up to each company. Though few lines formally recognized the ILA, its presence was 
tolerated on the more organized docks. This policy of expediency underscored the importance of self- 
reliance to New York's already atomized shipowners. Following a decade of such practices, seven 
separate waterfront associations had emerged to represent the port's increasingly diverse employer 
interests. This factionalism, concluded a 1918 Labor Department study, is "not particularly favorable 
for any close association of boat owners ... The result has been a more or less aloofness ... and a jealously 
guarded independence on the part of private operators. 32 
Employer disunity, however, was conducive to the growth of longshore unionism in New York. 
By sounding out weak spots among the shipowners and then targeting the most vulnerable lines, the 
ILA grew from 6,000 members in 1914 to over 40,000 four years later. In the face of the advancing 
union, waterfront employers offered little or no resistance, even when the relation of forces was clearly 
favorable. During a port-wide strike in 1919, for example, the shipowners never once threatened to 
sever relations with the ILA. On the contrary, the degree of support given union leaders in the course 
of the walkout was, a s  a contemporary observer noted, "almost without parallel in labor history, and is 
evidence of the confidence which the shipping interests at the port have in the intention of the 
organization to observe its agreements."33 After the walkout collapsed, the shipowners still failed to 
retaliate against the defenseless union. If their seeming restraint was partly a measure of the ILA's 
conservatism, it also reflected the employers' own capacity for self-organization, limited as  it was by the 
absence of an industry-wide leadership group on the waterfront. 
This is not to say that leadership dynamics alone determine how employers are going to respond 
to unions. Particularly in competitive product markets, it is also necessary to consider the way in which 
- 2% -.. 
'7 - -  market forces shape, sometimes differentially, the economic interest of rival employers. Where -*.* individual firms compete on a more or less equal footing, industry-wide resistance remains relatively 
- .  easy to organize. This, it seems, was the key to employer organization in New York City's fragmented 
-t- and leaderless garment industry. Down by the docks, however, where employers were internally divided 
by differing capacities to tolerate unionism, unity in the face of organized labor was far more difficult to 
achieve and even harder to maintain. 
i .?: A leading source of employer disunity on the New York waterfront was the sizable presence of 
- "". government operators. Commissioned under renewable cost-plus contracts let by the United States 
f >l -. Shipping Board, government lines were effectively insulated from market competition. As such, they 
found it easier than their commercial competitors to absorb the costs of unionism. At the same time, 
Shipping Board operators, as  representatives of the federal government, were necessarily more sensitive 
to "public opinion" than private interests: they could hardly expect to treat their own workers as  
harshly as commercial operators treated theirs without being accused of harboring anti-labor biases.34 
These- conciliatory government operators were a force to be reckoned with in New York. In 
1929, government vessels carried almost 10 percent of all cargo handled through the North Atlantic 
custom district, compared to less than 1 percent on the Pacific. As late as  1931, almost three years 
after the Board had transferred its Pacific Coast fleet to private ownership, regular government service 
to New York was still being provided by eight separate lines with a total of 67 vessels. Adding to the 
government's already considerable influence was the fact that the port's largest domestic carrier--the 
. 187,000 ton United States Line--was under exclusive contract to the Shipping ~ o a r d . ~ ~  
Alongside government operators stood some of Europe's most powerful commercial shipping 
lines. Prior to World War I, European influence had been so pervasive in New York that the port's 
overseas shippers organized a Foreign Commerce Club to promote their common interests. The 
withdrawal of most European vessels from the transatlantic carrying trade during the war afforded a 
brief respite from foreign competition. But the post-war resumption of commercial shipping once again 
restored European supremacy on the North Atlantic. By 1920, more than half of the nation's overseas 
waterborne commerce was being carried in foreign bottoms. To protest America's steadily deteriorating 
position in foreign trade, Herbert Hebermann, President of the Export Steamship Company, then the 
largest private New York line flying the American flag, resigned from the city's leading commercial 
association. In tendering his resignation from the New York Maritime Exchange, Hebermann declared 
"it was time foreign interests ceased to have a share in the direction of the American merchant 
marine. 1136 
(Insert Table 3 Here) 
Foreign influence on the East Coast can also be seen from statistics on overseas commerce. 
Table 3 compares the volume of domestic and foreign cargo shipments reported for the Port of New York 
and the Pacific Coast for 1930. The figures on coastwise and intercoastal trade provide a negative 
measure of foreign penetration, since both categories of domestic shipping were reserved by federal 
maritime law for American flag ships. .On this basis alone, then, over three-fourths (80%) of all cargo 
passing through Pacific Coast ports was legally protected from foreign competition, compared to less 
than two-third (62%) of all shipments in New York. The volume of overseas trade represents a more 
direct measure of foreign influence. Table 3 shows the profound regional disparity in foreign trade, 
which, in relative shares, was almost two times larger in New York (38%) than on the Pacific ( 2 0 % ~ ~ ~  
New York's greater reliance on foreign commerce placed the port's domestic lines in direct 
competition with more powerful European lines plying the North Atlantic. This heavily trafficked 
shipping corridor, already supporting many of the world's largest steamship lines, experienced a wave of 
corporate consolidations as  a result of the depression. In 1930, Germany's two largest lines pooled their 
enormous resources, bringing three-fourths of the nation's tonnage directly under their control. British 
shippers retaliated with rationalized transatlantic sailings and mergers. Less than a year later, 
Britain's four largest companies held in excess of two million gross tons. France's largest line then met 
this challenge by augmenting its fleet with modern combination passenger-cargo vessels. 3 9 
Whereas East Coast lines were "hard-pressed to hold a footing" against such established 
maritime powers a s  Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Norway, and Sweden, operators in the 
transpacific trade confronted a more decentralized, less competitive Japanese fleet along with a small 
number of tramp steamers and European vessels engaged in round-the-world service. Restricted to the 
coast's comparatively small overseas market, foreign lines lacked both the means and motives to 
challenge their American hosts. Instead, they tried "to get along," as  Paul St. Sure, former head of the 
West Coast employers association, explained in his 1957 oral history: 
The foreign lines on this coast represent a minority of tonnage. They've always taken the 
position, a t  least until recently, that "we are visitors in your country. We are a minority group, 
even on the waterfront. We should not dictate to you how you should handle your labor 
problems. We would like to get along, but if we can't, we're not going to tell you how to do it. 4 0 
In sharp contrast, the highly concentrated European lines servicing the East Coast operated far 
more independently of domestic shipowners. And, as  in the case of government operators, their 
independence took the form of a more accommodating stance towards dockside unionism. In the first 
place, foreign lines were better able to absorb higher stevedoring costs. With most voyages originating 
overseas, European vessels covered great distances, spending most of their time at sea rather than in 
port. Unlike domestic carriers confined to the intercoastal trade, whose routes took them from port to 
port, discharging and taking on cargo along the way, foreign lines docked only a t  ports of origin and 
destination. Consequently, cargo handling costs constituted a smaller, and therefore more affordable, 
expense for Europe's deepwater lines. Then, too, foreign operators had a stronger interest in 
cooperating with dockside labor. Manned by their own offshore personnel, they had little to gain by 
engaging an American longshore union in an extended and possibly costly confrontation. Their "beef' 
was with the offshore unions not dockworkers. 4 1 
The presence of so many competing interests undermined employer solidarity on the waterfront. 
When conciliatory foreign and government operators clashed with the port's more intransigent 
commercial operators, the resulting employer factionalism often worked to the advantage - of the union. 
Such was the case, for example, during contract negotiations in 1931. The shipowners opened 
negotiations that year by demanding a significant cut in wages. After the union balked, industry leaders 
hastily assembled a "Committee of Ten" to bargain on behalf of all waterfront employers in the port. 
But the appearance of unity masked deep-seated divisions, particularly between foreign and subsidized 
, government lines, on the one hand, and domestic commercial lines, on the other. The former, being 
generally more tolerant of unionism, openly voiced their concern to avoid a costly work stoppage. ILA 
leaders then promised that, in the event of a walkout, they would continue supplying union labor to any 
company willing to meet their counterproposal. In the absence of a few powerful American lines capable 
of enforcing discipline--as the Big Three in the West had been able to do under similar circumstances in 
1936--this selective strike threat shattered the employers' fragile unity. Within hours, Ryan reported 
that several transatlantic lines "expressed a willingness to meet the demands of the men." As more 
foreign companies defected, all seven Shipping Board lines in New York promptly signed with the union. 
The "Committee of Ten," now representing the more intransigent private American operators, 
reluctantly accepted the union's wage offer, although two of the largest domestic shippers, Grace and 
United Fruit, refused to sign a union contract.42 
This experience drove home the importance of establishing some form of port-wide organization, 
if only as a defensive measure to prevent the union from playing one shipowner off against another. A 
few months later, the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) was formed for the explicit purpose of 
representing all of the port's deepwater lines, both foreign and domestic. Its inclusive membership 
finally enabled the shipowners to contest the union's effective use of "whip saw" tactics. One of the 
8.1. 
.- - association's principal objectives was to secure an  agreement stipulating that the contract could not be 
:C changed through "individual action on the part of a company or union official." This provision, noted a 
student of the industry, was "mainly inserted to deter the union from concentrating on the weakness of 
an  individual employer to establish a precedent-setting action to bind all employers and the New York 
Shipping Association. 43 
The NYSA provided a formal instrument for collectively responding to the union. But its voting 
+ -- procedures, reflecting the fragmented state of the industry, rendered it all but powerless. Unlike the 
WEA of the Pacific, which codified the influence of the Big Three through proportional representation, 
each member of the NYSA received one vote, regardless of size. To further restrain powerful 
minorities, all major policy decisions required approval by three-fourths of all members. With numerous 
small voting blocks exercising effective veto power, no single interest group possessed sufficient strength 
to formulate basic policies on matters over which there was any disagreement. Hamstrung by 
"excessive democrac " the NYSA succumbed to bureaucratic inertia, capable of only passively reacting 
to union overtures. 4i', 
Frustrated in their attempts to influence the direction of the employer organization, many of the 
port's larger lines established informal bargaining relations with the ILA. Thus, during the 1930s the 
powerful Clyde-Mallory Line and nine other coastwise companies formed an unofficial negotiating 
committee to deal directly with the union. A confidential investigation conducted by the U.S. Maritime 
Commission elaborated on the purpose of this group: 
... the representatives of the ten principal coastwise operating lines find it convenient to meet a s  
a body and negotiate basic terms and conditions with the L A .  The same group acts in the same 
informal manner in settling disputes of a major character that arise under the agreement ... All 
other disputes are settled individually between the companies and the union--in most instances it 
is a matter of a telephone call--no records of settlements or disputes are kept. 
Similarly informal relations later developed between the employer association itself and the ILA. In 
1939 the Chairman of the NYSA told a government interviewer that the written contract between both 
parties was supplemented by "gentlemen's agreements or understandings." Describing their collective 
bargaining relationship as  "one of perfect harmony," the interviewer added that from the standpoint of 
the employers, "everything is lovely--they wouldn't change anything even if they had a chance. No 
problems--no trouble--just peace and contentment all around." 45 And so it would remain for many 
years to come. 
Conclusion 
Maritime employers on both coasts responded very differently to the emergence of working class 
organization on the docks following World War I. Whereas shipowners in the West waged a protacted 
struggle against longshore unionism, their counterparts in New York established close, and a t  time 
openly. collaborative, relations with the same union. The very different way that shipowners on both 
coasts responded to unionization was partly influenced by the character of working class organization 
itself. In the West where syndicalism was stronger, employer resistance was greater. Yet the absence 
of any such radical threat on the Great Lakes and the Gulf Coast did not deter shipowners there from 
responding even more aggressively than on the Pacific. If, a s  most specialists argue, labor "gets what it 
deserves," then, clearly, the non-combative unions on the Great Lakes and the Gulf were short-changed. 
As this suggests, employer responses were fashioned less a s  a conscious reaction to the 
character of unionism--whether conservative or radical--than as  an expression of the shipowners' own 
capacity to constitute themselves as  a cohesive social force in opposition to waterfront labor. These 
varying "class capacities" sprung initially from differences in industry structure. Concentrated 
ownership in the West created favorable conditions for unifying individual shipowners, whose limited 
horizons were subsumed under a broader and more militant vision articulated most forcefully by the 
largest firms. Conversely, the wider dispersion of capital in New York meant that there was no single 
leadership group powerful enough to transcend the many smaller employers and initiate port-wide 
organization. 
The relative organizational potential of shipowners on both coasts was then shaped by regional 
economic processes, resulting in markedly different policies toward organized labor. On the Pacific, 
employer intransigence was a product of their greater capacity for self-organization set within the 
context of an industry-wide intolerance of unionism. In New York, however, the industry's low 
tolerance for unionism was never realized in employer resistance. There the absence of port-wide 
leadership deprived capital of an organizational center of gravity, while competitive advantages enjoyed 
by foreign and especially government operators reproduced conditions for employer disorganization. 
Unable to resist collectively, and yet intolerant of independent unionism, New York's domestic 
shipowners established close working relations with conservative ILA leaders. 
All this is to say that-it  may be necessary to rethink the nature of the relationship between 
employer responses and industry structure. While it is true that the largest West coast shippers were-- 
in accord with the theory of corporate liberalism--highly conscious of their group interests and, in 
general, the most far-sighted, their sights were not set on accommodating unions but rather driving 
them from the waterfront. If anything, it was the smaller, presumably more myopic, companies that 
were most accommodating. Constrained by an "intolerant" product market that militated against 
employer organization, they became the voice of "reason" and moderation on the docks, the true 
corporate liberals. Whatever advantages the largest lines may have enjoyed in dealing with unions had 
more to do with their own capacity for self-organization than with their greater financial resources, 
monopoly power or any other such variables that labor economists normally consider. Organizational 
capabilities, not market situation, ultimately determined how employers responded to unions. 
FOOTNOTES 
The quote is from Barbash 1956, p. 342. For similar statements positing a causal 
relationship between anti-union employer "ideology" and labor radicalism, see Golden and 
Ruttenberg 1942, Chapter 3; Taft 1954. 
The sharply contrasting employer responses to unionism in the West Coast maritime and 
wood products industries, and the resulting impact on the quality of labor relations, is 
discussed by Eliel 1949. 
Ryan is quoted in the ILA's national publication, Longshoremen's Journal, December 
1930, p. 3. 
The quote is from Gorter and Hildebrand 1954, p. 261. For a similar view, see 
Schneider and Siege1 1956, p. 34. 
Levinson 1967. Fortune 1952, p. 74. 
6. Levinson, 1967; Segal, 1964; Galbraith, 1967. 
- 7. The quote is from Weinstein 1968, p. 4. For similar treatments of corporate liberalism, 
see Williams 1966, esp. pp. 390-413; and Radosh 1983, p. 16 
8. Hodson 1983, p. 16 
9. U.S. Shipping Board Papers. Record Group 32, General File 1920-36. "Analysis of 
Results of Operation of Ocean-Going Shipping Services Owned by American Companies," 
dated August 19, 1932. 
10. Eliel 1937, p. 513. 
11. For an analysis of the Wobblies' deeper penetration in the west, see Kimeldorf, 1985. 
12. Hobsbawn 1964, p. 220. 
13. On U.S. Steel's domination of the Lake Carrier's Association, see Larrowe 1959, chapter 
3. 
14. Data are from the American Bureau of Shipping 1930. These figures are limited to non- 
industrial carriers of at least 1,000 gross tons. Company totals include all wholly owned 
subsidiaries, as  identified in Moody's Manual of Investments. American and Foreign. 
Industrial Securities. 1931, New York, pp. 304, 2762. 
Camp 1947, p. 413. 
Plant 1956, p. 33 
Quinn 1949, pp. 45, 54. 
The government mediator is quoted in Clements 1975, p. 113. The estimate of coastwise 
cargo is from Business Week, July 14, 1934, p. 7. 
San Pedro's strikebreaking 'expenses are reported in Dunne n.d. (1934?), p. 41. 
The San Francisco meeting is reported in the San Francisco Chronical May 12, 1934, p. 
1. 
The La Follette quote is cited in Lucy 1948, p. 211. Lapham's Washington visit is 
mentioned in Larrowe 1977, p. 100. 
Plant expounded his views in a private letter reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate 
' 
Committee on Education and Labor. Violation of Free Speech and Rights of Labor; 78th 
Congress, 1st Session; Report No. 398, pt. 1,. 1943, p. 1055 (La Follette Committee 
Hearings). 
Lapham is quoted in La Follette Committee Hearings, p. 1056. The position of 
dissenting lines is documented in La Follette Committee, p. 1066. The New York Times 
article is cited in Adamic 1936, p. 579. 
. La Follette Committee Hearings, pp. 1068, 1069. 
The employer lockout is covered in Larrowe 1977, p. 108. 
The Pacific Shipper is quoted in International Longshoremen's Association n.d. (1937?), 
p. 15. Oregon Daily Journal October 24, 1936. 
The editorial is from the Pacific Shipper September 28, 1936, p. 15. International 
Longshoremen's Association n.d. (1937?), p. 7. Pacific Shipper December 14, 1936, p. 7. 
The "Lapham Formula" is covered in Business Week, October 24, 1938. 
Kerr and Fisher, 1948, p. 33. 
Pacific Marine Review April 1937, p. 17 (emphasis added). 
The categorization of operators presented in this table reflects the major voting blocks 
within the WEA a t  the time of its incorporation, as  identified by internal employer 
correspondence. Both the data used in constructing this table and the supporting 
correspondence are from Waterfront Employers Association Papers, Memorandum from 
A..Boyd to Mr. A.E. Roth, dated June 19, 1937. 
On the 1907 strike, see Barnes 1915, pp. 118, 119. The Labor Department study is by 
Squires 1918, p. 47. 
Squires 1919, pp. 100, 114. 
On the government's role in the maritime industry, see Smith and Betters, 1931. 
Cargo statistics for 1929 are from U.S. Department of Commerce 1932, p. 4 13. 
Information on the extent of government service to New York is in Smith and Betters, 
1931, pp. 92, 93. 
The history of New Yorkys Foreign Commerce Club is related in Marine Progress June 
1934, pp. 15, 30. The estimate of cargo carried in foreign vessels is from Lang 1943, p. 
11. Hebermann's resignation and statement are reported in the New York Times 
August 19, 1927, p. 25. 
Data for foreign and coastwise shipments are from U.S. Department of Commerce 1932, 
p. 400. Intercoastal shipments are only reported in "long" cargo tons of 2,240 pounds. 
See U.S. Shipping Board 1930. The estimates for intercoastal shipments presented here 
are thus based on the number of long tons plus an added 10.7% to account for the 
difference between long and regular cargo tons of 2,000 pounds. 
These figures fail to reflect the full economic significance of foreign trade to commercial 
shipping. In the first place, they refer to volume, rather than dollar values, of cargo. 
Yet shipowners are compensated not only on the basis of volume, but also according to 
the distance a shipment is carried. In comparing categories of shipping, then, it is 
important to bear in mind, that while the volume of coastwise shipments is larger owing 
to the shorter distance and greater frequency of sailings, the rate per cargo unit is 
considerably less than in intercoastal and, particularly, long distance overseas trade. 
Consequently, the dollar value of foreign trade, and thus, its significance to commercial 
shipping, far exceeds its relative importance as measured by tonnage. Secondly, cargo 
figures, of course, do not reflect revenue earned from passenger traffic. Yet this was a 
far more important source of income in the East than in the West. In 1929, for 
example, transatlantic tourists outnumbered transpacific tourists -by a ratio of 19 to 1. 
See Radius 1944, p. 1.2. In short, foreign commerce was an even more vital part of New 
York's maritime industry than tonnage figures alone might indicate. 
39. Business Week, January 21, 1931, p. 6. 
Pacific Shipper, June 22, 1931, p. 6. St. Sure 1957, pp. 609, 610. 
41. On the more compliant posture of foreign operators, see Levinson 1966, p. 154. 
The New York Times, September 29, 1931, p. 51, and January 28, 1932, p. 17. 
43. On the NYSA, see Collins 1955, p. 28. 
44. The internal procedures of the NYSA are outlined in U.S. Maritime Commission Papers, 
Record Group 157, File 095, 1938-1942. "New York Shipping Association," dated 
January 24, 1939. 
U.S. Maritime Commission Papers, Record Group 157, File 055.2, 1938- 1942. "Report 




"Harry Bridges: Rank-and-File Leader" The Nation 142 (May 6): 576- 
58'0. 
Barbash, Jack 
1956 The Practice of Unionism New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers. 
Barnes, Charles B. 
1915 The Longshoremen. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Camp, William Martin 
1947 San Francisco: Port of Gold. Garden City: Doubleday & Company. 
Clements, Joyce 
1975 The San Francisco Maritime and General Strikes of 1934 and the 
Dynamics of Repression. unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
. Collins, John J. 
1955 Longshoremen of the Port of New York. unpublished M.A. thesis, New 
School for Social Research. 
Dunne, William F. 
n/d(1934?) The Great San Francisco General Strike. New York: Workers' Library 
Publishers. 
Eliel, Paul 
1937 "Labor Problems in Our Steamship Business" Yale Review 26 (March): 
510-532. 
1949 "Industrial Peace and Conflict: A Study of Two Pacific Coast Industries" 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 2 (July): 477-501. 
Fortune 
1952 "Big Business is Organized by Labor" (June): 74. 
Galbraith, John Kenneth 
1967 The New Industrial State. Second Edition. New York: Houghton Mimin 
Company. 
Golden, Clinton, and Harold Ruttenberg 
1942 Dynamics of Industrial Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers. 
Gorter, Wytze, and George H. Hildebrand 
1954 The Pacific Coast Maritime Shiping Industry, 1930-1948. Volume Two: 
An Analysis of Performance. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Hobsbawm, Eric 
1964 Labouring Men. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Hodson, Randy 
1983 Workers' Earnings and Corporate Economic Structure. New York: 
Academic Press. 
International Longshoremen's Association, Local 38-79 
n/d(1937?) The Maritime Crisis: What it is and What it isn't. San Francisco: 
International Longshoremen's Association. 
Kerr, Clark and Lloyd Fisher 
1948 "Multiple Employer Bargaining: The S.F. Experience" Pp. 25-61, in 
Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister (eds.) Insights Into Labor Issues 
New York: MacMillan Co. 
Kimeldorf, Howard 
1985 "Working Class Culture, Occupational Recruitment, and Union Politics" 
Social Forces 64 (December): 359-376. 
Lang, Frederick J. 
1943 Maritime: A Historical Sketch and a Workers' Program. New York: 
Pioneer Publishers. 
Larrowe, Charles P. 
Maritime Labor Relations on the Great Lakes. East Lansing, Michigan: 
Labor and Industrial Relations Center, University of Michigan. 
1977 Harry Bridges: The Rise and Fall of Radical Labor in the United States. 
Second Edition. Westport: Lawrence Hill & Company. 
Levinson, Harold M. 
1966 Determining Forces in Collective Bargaining. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
1967 "Unionism, Concentration, and Wage Changes: Toward a United Theory" 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 20 (January): 198-205. 
Lucy, George E. 
1948 Group Employer-Employee Industrial Relations in the San Francisco 
Maritime Industry 1888-1947. unpublished Ph.D. thesis, St. Louis 
University. 
Plant, Thomas G. 
1956 Transcript of interview conducted by Corinee Gilb. Oral History Collection, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Quin, Mike (Pseud. for Paul Ryan) 
The Big Strike. New York: International Publishers (originally published 
in 1949). 
Radius, Walter A. 
1944 United States Shipping in Transpacific Trade 1922- 1938. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Radosh, Ronald 
1966 "The Corporate Ideology of American Labor Leaders from Gompers to 
Hillman" Studies on the Left 6 (November-December): 66-68. 
Russell, Maud 
1966 Men Along the Shore. New York: Brussel & Brussel. 
Schneider, Betty V. H. and Abraham Siege1 
Industrial ~e l a t ion i  in the Pacific Coast Longshore Industry. Berkeley: 
Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California Press. 
Segal, M. 
1964 "Union Wage Impact and Market Structure" Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 78 (February): 96-1 14. 
Smith, Darrell Hevenor and Paul V. Betters 
1931 The United States Shipping Board: Its History, Activities, and 
Organization. Washington: Brookings Institution. 
Squires, Benjamin M. 
1918 "Associations of Harbor Boat Owners and Employees in the Port of New 
York" Monthly Labor Review 7 (2): 45-62. 
1919 "The Strike of the Longshoremen at the Port of New York" Monthly Labor 
Review 9 (6): 95-115. 
St. Sure, Paul J. 
1957 Transcript of interview conducted by Corinne Gilb in 1957. Oral History 
Collection, University of California, Berkeley. 
Taft, Philip 
1954 "Ideolonies and Industrial Conflict" PP. 257-265 in Arthur Kornhauser, 
Robertbubin, Arthur M. Ross (eds.), industrial Conflict. New York: 
. 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce 
1932 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1932. Washington: USGPO. 
U.S. Shipping Board, Bureau of Research, Maritime Records Division 
United States Water Borne Traffic by Port of Origin and Destination and 
Principal Commodities. 
Weinstein, James 
1968 The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900-1918. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Williams, William Appleman 
1966 The Contours of American History. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 
Table 1 
Gross Tonnage of Vessels Owned by the Ten 
Largest American Lines Headquartered on 
the Pacific Coast and 
New York City, 1936 '4, 
Pacific Coast Lines 
Matson Navigation Co. 
American-Hawaiian SS Co. 
Dollar Co. 
Pacific Atlantic SS Co. 
American Mail Line 
Pacific SS Co. 
States SS Co. 
Alaska SS Co. 
Tacoma Oriental SS Co. 
Alaska Packers Assn. 
New York City Lines 
United States Lines 
Luckenback SS Co. 
Export SS Co. 
Munson SS Line 
United Fruit 
Grace SS Co. 
Moore & McCormack 
Eastern SS Line 
American Line SS Corp. 
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Distribution of Votes in the Waterfront Employers 
Association of the Pacific, June 1937'. .3  1 
Number of Number of Percent of 
Operating Category Companies ---- Votes Total Votes 
West Coast Deepwater Lines 9 
Big Three 3 
Others 6 
Coastwise Steam Schooners 39 41 18 
East Coast Deepwater Lines 10 3 4 15 
Foreign-owned Lines 
Table. 3 
Distribution of Waterborne Conimerce by Type 
of Service for Ports on the Pacific Coast 
and New ~ o r k  City, 1930'3.7 
Pacific Coast New York City 
,Total Cargo Shipments 
(in thousands of 
cargo tons) 94,843 69,535 
Percent of Total Shipments 
Domestic 
Coastwise 
Intercoastal 
Foreign 
